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Abstract—Resource allocations determine an important 
management task for operational Grids and networks, especially 
under the constraint of commercially offered resources. Therefore, 
the need for an optimal allocation of this task arises, and this 
paper proposes a trust-incentive-based combinatorial double 
auction algorithm for these resource allocations in Grids. The key 
and new contribution is the design of a trust-incentive mechanism, 
which is integrated into an existing combinatorial double auction 
algorithm (a) to improve the performance of Grid resource 
allocation and (b) ensure that trust values of participating bidders 
(typically Grid users, termed peers) are considered. In the newly 
developed trust-incentive-based algorithm, each peers’ trust value 
is adopted to adjust their bids in the process of the combinatorial 
double auction. After each transaction, peers participating in the 
transaction rate each other to setup and update the bilateral trust 
relationship. Those simulation results obtained demonstrate that 
the algorithm proposed can improve the efficiency of resource 
sharing greatly by providing applicable incentives to trustworthy 
peers to contribute more resources. Moreover, this algorithm can 
identify and eliminate malicious peers in the system to enhance 
the Grid security level in that respect.  
Index Terms—Trust, Incentives, Combinatorial Double 
Auction, Behavior Trust, Direct Trust, Reputation 
I. INTRODUCTION
rid systems are defined as the next generation computing 
platform for solving large-scale problems in science, 
engineering, and commerce [2,3]. According to the 
heterogeneous and uncertain characters of a Grid, a dynamic 
Grid resource allocation is reasonable and required for 
commercially operated Grids. Market-oriented resources 
allocation is a significant research topic in the field of Grid 
research, since Grid resources are commodities with certain 
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access prices, except for a few number of free resources. In 
general, Grid resources include computational power, storage, 
software library utilization, and network resources. Therefore, 
(a) the economic and (b) the secure management of Grids and 
their resources determine a key part of network management 
tasks. This is underlined by the fact that the combination of 
traditional service management tasks are now combined with 
economic optimization schemes, which in the overall solution 
can form an important step ahead to economic management 
principles needed for commercially operated systems.   
In that context, mainly focusing initially on the economic 
dimension mainly, a Combinatorial Double Auction (CDA) 
algorithm was proposed [1], which can not only complete the 
allocation and pricing for several items of resources in a one 
round auction, but also achieves the entire resource allocation 
status and bids information. This CDA approach was proven to 
be feasible and efficient. However, for several additional 
challenging issues in Grids, including the free-riding problem 
from selfish peers as well as fraud and collusion from malicious 
peers, the pure CDA algorithm cannot gain the best 
performance due to misuse potentials. In order to avoid this 
problem and address trust aspects in an integrated manner, a 
new Trust-incentive-based Combinatorial Double Auction 
(TI-CDA) algorithm was developed, in which a novel 
trust-incentive mechanism is designed and introduced. The 
main idea of this trust-incentive mechanism is to adopt each 
peer’s trust values to adjust their bids in the process of an 
auction. After each transaction, peers participating in the 
transaction will rate each other and all these rates are used to 
setup and update bilateral trust relationships. On one hand, the 
scheme is based on pricing monetary values, so it can provide 
incentives to peers to contribute more resources to mitigate the 
influence of free-riding. On the other hand, the bilateral trust 
relationship between peers can identify malicious peers in the 
system and eliminate or constrain them to participate in further 
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resource allocation steps. Experimental results show that the 
proposed scheme is effective and the performance of Grid 
resource allocation is improved, while a certain trust-based 
security level can be reached. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines briefly 
related work, addressing CDAs and trust-incentives. While 
Section III defines the Trust-incentive-based Combinatorial 
Double Auction (TI-CDA) algorithm, Section IV presents the 
trust-incentive mechanism. Finally, Section V discusses 
evaluations and draws conclusions.  
II.RELATED WORK
Related work on the subject of resource allocation in Grids is 
quite large in purely technical terms. However, the utilization 
of CDAs is newer, thus, shortly summarized below. In addition, 
the trust-incentives aspects in that domain complement the 
background needed for this new management scheme.  
A. CDA for Grid Resource Allocation 
It is well known that double auctions, in which both sides 
submit demand or supply bids, are much more efficient than 
several one-sided auctions (amongst others cf. [1]). Moreover, 
compared to one-sided auctions, where multiple buyers 
compete for commodities sold by one seller, or, multiple sellers 
compete for the right to sell to one buyer, double auction can 
prevent monopoly or monophony. CDAs [4] can not only 
represent the advantages of combinatorial auction, but also 
consider core requirements of both buyers and sellers. It is, 
thus, more suitable for the resource allocation in Grids.  
The objective of the combinatorial double auction is to 
maximize the total trade surplus, while satisfying the constraint 
that the number of units selected by buy bundles does not 
exceed the number provided by selected sell bundles, 
applicable to each item. Suppose there is an item set M , in 
which there are m  items. In consequence, the model reads as 
follows:  
1
max
n
j j
j
p x
=
¦                                          (1) 
1
. . 0
n
ij j
j
s t a x i M
=
≤ ∀ ∈¦                       (2) 
}1,0{∈jx },...,1{ nj ∈∀
The set of bid bundles is B = {
1 ,
,..., ...,j nB B B }, in which 
there are n bundles. A bid jB can be specified as ( ,j ja p ), 
where a = (
1 ,
,..., ...,j ij mja a a ), ija is the units of item 
i
requested (when 0
ij
a > ) or supplied (when 0
ij
a < ) in the 
bundle j . 
j
p is the amount the bidder is willing to pay for the 
bundle j . If 0
j
p > , it is regarded as a buy bid, otherwise it is 
regarded as a sell bid. Based on theoretical considerations it can 
be seen that such a model can be solved for a given problem as a 
so-called 0-1 programming problem. The method proposed for 
the WDP (Winner Determination Problem) [10] can also be 
used for reference, since WDP in combinatorial auctions is the 
problem of, given a finite set of combinatorial bids B, finding a 
feasible subset B' of B with a maximum revenue.  
B. Trust-incentives for Grid Resource Allocation 
Several challenging issues in Grids, including free-riding, 
malicious peers, and collusion, have become the bottleneck in 
the application of combinatorial double auctions for Grid 
resources allocation. Firstly, in a distributed environment of 
Grids decisions of individual peers are based on their own 
self-interest and this may lead to an inefficient system 
operation. In particular, a rational peer would participate in the 
system without contributing any resources following the 
so-called “free-riding” approach [5]. Secondly, malicious peers 
participating in a Grid may disturb the resource sharing process 
by acting as malicious providers or malicious customers. On 
one hand, malicious providers will boast of having an 
over-estimated amount of resources or they may even introduce 
viruses. On the other hand, a malicious consumer may not want 
to act the corresponding payment, or it may give the provider an 
unfair rating. Considering the dynamic and uncertain character 
of a Grid, a suitable trust-incentive mechanism is required to 
effectively improve the performance of Grid resource 
allocation. 
Although much research has been done from the perspective 
of sociology, economics, and social psychology, there is still no 
consensus on what trust is and many different definitions exist. 
Azzedin and Maheswaran [6] define trust as “the firm belief in 
the competence of an entity to act as expected such that this 
firm belief is not a fixed value associated with the entity but 
rather it is subject to the entity’s behavior and applies only 
within a specific context at a given time”. Trust is a complex 
concept and can be classified into two categories: (a) identity 
trust and (b) behavior trust. Identity trust is concerned with 
verifying the authenticity of an entity and determining the 
authorizations that the entity is entitled to access, which is 
based on techniques including encryption, data hiding, digital 
signatures, authentication protocols, and access control 
methods. Whereas behavior trust deals with a wider notion of 
an entity’s “trustworthiness” and can evolve based on history 
transactions between two entities.  Accordingly, identity trust is 
usually used to identify a static form of trust and behavior trust 
is used to learn the dynamic and changing conditions of each 
transaction and update the relationship between peers for future 
decision. The TI-CDA approach proposed focuses on behavior 
trust, and unless explicitly stated, “trust” means “behavior 
trust” in the remainder of this paper. 
In the sense of reliability, trust is a measure of 
trustworthiness based on past experiences and is made up of 
two main sources: (i) the experience derived from past 
transactions and (ii) collected referral information gathered 
from third party sources. The former one is named as direct 
trust, while the latter one is named as indirect trust, i.e. 
recommendation trust or reputation. According to 
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [7], a reputation is an expectation 
about an agent’s behavior based on information about or 
observations of its past behavior. 
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III. TRUST-INCENTIVE-BASED COMBINATORIAL DOUBLE 
AUCTION (TI-CDA) ALGORITHM
To provide incentives to peers to contribute more Grid 
resources or behave well, a novel trust-incentive mechanism is 
designed at this stage and integrated into the combinatorial 
double auction developed previously [1]. The corresponding 
TI-CDA architecture is depicted in Fig.1. 
In this TI-CDA architecture, the bilateral trust relationship is 
setup based on ratings after each transaction. In the next step 
corresponding bilateral adjust coefficients – including ( )TP i
and ( )TC i  – are mapped based on each peer’s trust value, 
which are adopted to adjust bids of customers and providers in 
the auction. When the peer acts as provider, the adjust 
coefficient ( )TP i  is adopted. When a peer acts as customer, the 
adjust coefficient ( )TC i is adopted. Therefore, the basic model 
introduced in Section 2 can be adapted as follows: 
'
1
max
n
j j
j
p x
=
¦                                          (3) 
1
. . 0
n
ij j
j
s t a x i M
=
≤ ∀ ∈¦                       (4) 
}1,0{∈jx },...,1{ nj ∈∀
'
( )
( )
j
j
j
TP j p if peer j is provider
p
TC j p if peer j is customer
⋅­°
= ®
⋅°¯
The following subsections describe in closer detail the 
trust-incentive mechanism used to setup the bilateral trust 
relationship and to map the two bilateral adjust coefficients 
( )TP i  and ( )TC i . 
IV. TRUST-INCENTIVE MECHANISM
Based on the trust model and its internal rating as well 
propagation schemes the incent-coefficient model is developed.  
A. Trust Model 
The trust model for TI-CDA is designed to setup and update 
bilateral trust relationships between peers in a Grid. The Global 
Trust Value (GTV) of a provider and a customer are the output 
of that trust model and are calculated, respectively.  
A.1 GTV of a Provider 
The GTV of a provider is based on its transaction history. 
The principle is that before two peers begin to transact, they 
will query the Direct Trust Value (DTV) table and subsequently 
calculate the Reputation Trust Value (RTV) between them. The 
GTV is aggregated from the DTV and the RTV. After each 
transaction, peers will rate each other as for instance in eBay [8] 
and all rating results will be used to update the DTV. 
A.1.1 Rating and DTV 
For TI-CDA, 
ijD  denotes the DTV that Peer i  owns Peer j , 
which is based on past direct experience and obtained from the 
customer’s rating. Here it is assumed that every time a customer 
rates the provider as positive ( 1)+ or negative ( 1)− [9], 
representing a satisfactory or an unsatisfactory transaction, 
respectively. The total number of satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory transactions between Peer i  and Peer j  are 
stored in ( , )Sat i j  and ( , )Unsat i j . In consequence, ijD is 
calculated as follows: 
( , )
( , ) ( , )
ij
Transaction i j
Sat i j Unsat i j
D
N
−
=                         (5) 
1
1
Satisfactory
Rating
Unsatisfactory
+­
= ®
−¯
                  (6) 
This approach ensures that all values for all ijD  will be 
between 0 and 1. 
A.1.2 Time Decay Function and CDTV 
During the provisioning of a Grid service, typically 
environment conditions are not static – additional evidence and 
experiments at a later time may decrease the DTV between 
Peer i and Peer j. Therefore, when two peers begin a 
transaction, the Current Direct Trust Value (CDTV) is likely to 
be lower than the DTV, which has been updated after the last 
transaction. In order to adapt to these changes that occur over 
time, a time decay function is introduced, which reflects this 
drop. Thus, the CDTV between two peers is computed as the 
product of the DTV and the time decay function “T(t)”. 
According to the key characteristics of the trust model, a time 
decay function complying with the exponential distribution is 
suitable. Under the reasonable and practical condition that the 
DTV will decrease to about 10 percent of the original value in 
10,800 seconds (3 hours), a suitable time decay function can be 
defined as follows: 
( )
2.3
10800
t
t e
−
×
Τ =                                  (7) 
Fig. 1.  Architecture of Trust-incentive-based Combinatorial 
Double Auction (TI-CDA) Algorithm 
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Here, the parameter “t” represents the time duration between 
two transactions. The distribution of parameter “t” is dependent 
on the applications and services of the Grid system, which can 
be induced by statistic comparison. 
A.1.3 Trust Propagation and RTV 
The RTV is based on the propagation property of trust, 
adopting the reputation or recommendation from a third party 
source. For example, Peer i  wants to make a decision on 
whether to transact with Peer j , which is unknown to it, Peer i
can rely on the reputation of Peer j . Simply speaking, although 
peers do not know the DTV of Peer i  to Peer j , but the DTV of 
Peer i  to Peer k  and Peer k  to Peer j  is available, it is feasible 
to obtain the RTV of Peer i  to Peer j . The RTV is divided from 
the DTV of third party sources through a trust propagation path, 
which has to be considered comprehensively. 
An issue concerning the trust propagation can be described 
as a “propagation method”, which can be explained as follows: 
“If the DTV of Peer i  to Peer k  is 
,i kD , and the DTV of Peer k
to Peer j  is ,k jD , which information can be derived about RTV 
of Peer i  to Peer j ?” From the view of probabilistic theory, 
multiplication is used as the main operation to calculate the 
RTV, that is ( , ) ( , ) ( , )RTV i j DTV i k DTV k j= × , in brief 
, , ,i j i k k jRTV D D= × . 
The second issue is concerned with the “propagation path”. 
Trust propagation is used to “spread” initial polarity values to 
all possible pairs of nodes. However, there will be many 
propagation paths between two peers, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
If every peer contributes to the recommendation of every other 
peer, the complexity will increase rapidly. Generally speaking, 
trust propagation has to be a compromise of both performance 
and efficiency. Consequently, the propagation path should be 
limited to referenced transitive depths. TI-CDA takes 2 
transitive depths as an example to illustrate the process of 
propagation path searching. In Fig.2 to Fig. 4, the path from 
peer i to peer j means DTV of peer i to peer j, i.e. 
, jiD . 
In Fig. 2, there is no direct trust path between Peer 1 and 
Peer 7, which are highlighted in purple (dark circles). Before 
Peer 1 transacts with Peer 7, it has to calculate the RTV of 
Peer 1 to Peer 7 (
1,7
RTV ). For the propagation depth 1, all paths 
will be searched, which are highlighted in green (light grey 
circles) in Fig. 3, and corresponding RTVs are calculated, 
respectively. The average of these RTVs represents the 
reputation trust value of propagation depth 1, i.e. _ 1RTV R , as 
shown below: 
1
, ,
1_ 1
1
N
i k k j
n
D D
RTV R
N
=
×
=
¦
                    (8) 
Here, 1N  determines the number of all propagation paths of 
propagation depth 1. 
In this particular example and instance the result reads as: 
1,2 2,7 1,8 8,7
_ 1
2
D D D D
RTV R
× + ×
=             (9) 
For the propagation depth 2, _ 2RTV R  can be deduced in a 
similar fashion. All propagation paths are highlighted in yellow 
(light grey circle) in Fig. 4 and the reputation trust value of 
propagation depth 2, i.e. _ 2RTV R  can be read as follows: 
2
, , ,
1_ 2
2
N
i p p q q j
n
D D D
RTV R
N
=
× ×
=
¦
             (10) 
Here, 2N  determines the number of all propagation paths of 
propagation depth 2. 
In this particular example and instance the result reads as: 
1,2 2,3 3,7 1,9 9,8 8,7
_ 2
2
D D D D D D
RTV R
× × + × ×
=      (11) 
When RTVs of all propagation depth are available, they will 
be weighted as follows to obtain the Aggregated Reputation 
Trust Value (Aggregated RTV): 
_ 1 _ 2 ,
1 , , 0
RTV RTV R RTV Rλ γ
λ γ λ γ
= + + ⋅⋅⋅
+ + ⋅⋅ ⋅ = ⋅⋅ ⋅ ≥
< <
Fig. 3.  Trust Propagation (Propagation Depth 1) 
Fig. 4.  Trust Propagation (Propagation Depth 2) 
Fig. 2.  Trust Propagation (Propagation Depth 0, i.e. DTV) 
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Here, these coefficients λ , γ , … express different 
preferences of _ 1RTV R , _ 2RTV R . 
In this example, the result with 0.8 0.2λ γ= =  reads: 
_ 1 _ 2,
0.8 _ 1 0.2 _ 2
1 , 0
RTV RTV R RTV R
RTV R RTV R
λ γ
λ γ λ γ
= +
= +
+ = ≥
< <
< <
A.1.4 TTV and GTV of a Provider 
The Total Trust Value (TTV) is derived from the DTV and 
the RTV and similarly the weight method is introduced to 
denote the different importance of DTV and RTV. Let the 
weights given to DTV and RTV be α  and β , respectively, 
with 1α β+ = , and , 0α β ≥ . The TTV is computed as follows: 
,
1
TTV DTV RTVα β
α β
= +
+ =
< <
If the TTV relies more on the DTV than on the RTV, α
should be larger than β . Here, it is assumed 
that 0.8, 0.2α β= = . 
Finally, the GTV of a provider refers to the entire system 
assessment of a peer, which is derived by averaging the TTV 
between each peer. 
A.2 GTV of the Customer 
The GTV of customers is also based on customers’ ratings. 
After each transaction, the latest rating from customers is 
imported into the “Rating Filtering” module depicted in Fig. 1 
to judge, whether it is fair or not. Take customer i  for example, 
the total number of fair and unfair ratings from customer i  are 
stored in ( )Fair i  and ( )Unfair i , respectively. In consequence, 
the GTV of customer i  can be evaluated as follows: 
( ) 3* ( )
( ) :
( ) :
ijD Fair i Unfair i
Fair i Fair Rating Numbers of Customer i
Unfair i Unfair Rating Numbers of Customer i
= −
The judging principle of “Rating Filtering” is to compare the 
latest rating from customer i  with history ratings from other 
customers, and the judging criteria is as follows: If the number 
of consistent history ratings is by 3 larger than that of the 
contrary history ratings, this rating is deemed to be fair; if the 
number of the consistent history ratings is by 3 smaller than that 
of contrary history ratings, this rating is deemed to be unfair; 
otherwise, the rating is deemed to be neutral. 
B. Incent-coefficient Model 
As shown in Fig. 1, when GTVs of providers and customers 
are obtained, they will be used as an input into the 
incent-coefficient model to generate the two bilateral adjust 
coefficients TP(i) and TC(i). Under the condition that the 
number of transactions exceeds 3, the mapping of bilateral 
adjust coefficients are denoted as TABLE I and TABLE II. 
Here, TP(i) and TC(i) represent those adjust coefficients of 
providers and customers, respectively. 
V.SIMULATIONS
To show the effectiveness of the TI-CDA model and 
algorithm, i.e. its immunity against malicious peers, 
simulations have been conducted in two different scenarios 
with different proportion of malicious peers in the system. In 
these simulations, it is assumed that the number of peers in the 
system is 100 and the number of transactions is 1000, achieving 
a reasonably stable result of the TI-CDA auction. In Scenario 1, 
the proportion of malicious providers and customers was set to 
10%. In contrast, in Scenario 2, the proportion of malicious 
providers was set to 50%, and the proportion of malicious 
customers was set to 40%. In each scenario, the number of 
successful transactions of every peer has been recorded. The 
detailed configuration of these simulations is depicted in 
TABLE III and all simulation results are shown in Fig. 5 to 
Fig. 8. Note that these figures do draw for each peer no. 1 to no. 
100 (numbers on the x axis) the respective number of 
transactions seen (integer values on the y axis), based on the 
simulation’s outcome.  
As mentioned, the incentive model allows for constraining 
the number of malicious peers. As it can be derived from Fig. 5, 
due to those assumptions made in TABLE III, malicious 
providers have fewer transactions compared to normal 
providers, which was the design goal, to prevent malicious 
TABLE  I 
MAPPING OF PROVIDER’S ADJUST COEFFICIENT
Grade of 
Providers 
Grade of Providers DTV of Providers TP(i) 
1 Very Untrustworthy DTV of Providers < 0 5 
2 Untrustworthy 0  DTV of Providers < 0.2 1.5 
3 Neutral 0.2  DTV of Providers < 0.5 1 
4 Trustworthy 0.5  DTV of Providers < 0.8 0.85 
5 Very Trustworthy 0.8  DTV of Providers < 1 0.7 
TABLE  ɉ
MAPPING OF CUSTOMER’S ADJUST COEFFICIENT
Grade of 
Customers
DTV of Customers 
Adjust 
Coefficients 
of Customers
(TC(i)) 
1 DTV of Customers < 0 0.5 
2 0  DTV of Customers < 10 1.1 
3 10  DTV of Customers < 20 1.2 
4 20  DTV of Customers < 30 1.3 
5 30  DTV of Customers < 40 1.4 
6 40  DTV of Customers < 50 1.5 
7 50  DTV of Customers < 60 1.6 
8 60  DTV of Customers < 70 1.7 
9 70  DTV of Customers < 80 1.8 
10 80  DTV of Customers < 90 1.9 
11 90  DTV of Customers < 100 2.0 
12 100  DTV of Customers 2.5 
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providers to participate in full in the auctioning process. 
Furthermore, in Fig. 6 malicious customers also have the 
designed “difficulties” – better to term exclusions from 
transactions – to participate in a transaction.  
The same type of conclusions can be derived from Fig. 7 and 
Fig. 8 as well, even if the malicious peers are up to 50% of the 
providers and 40% of the customers in the network, forming a 
malicious collective to subvert the system.  
To further illustrate the non-malicious peers’ and malicious 
peers’ capability of participating in transactions corresponding 
to different scenarios, another set of experiments was 
conducted with different proportions of malicious peers in 
different scenarios. In these experiments, the number of peers 
was set to 50, and the number of transactions was set to 1000, 
again to achieve a stable simulation result.  
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Fig.5: Transaction Numbers of Providers  
(Scenario 1: 10% Malicious Providers) 
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Fig.6: Transaction Numbers of Customers  
(Scenario 1: 10% Malicious Customers) 
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Fig.8: Transaction Numbers of Customers  
(Scenario 2: 40% Malicious Customers) 
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Fig.7: Transaction Numbers of Providers  
(Scenario 2: 50% Malicious Providers) 
TABLEɒ
DETAILED CONFIGURATION OF THE SIMULATION SET-UP
Scenario 1 
10% Malicious Providers 10% Malicious Customers 
Peer n*10+2 (n=0~9) Peer n*10+8 (n=0~9) 
Scenario 2 
50% Malicious Providers  40% Malicious Customers 
Peer n*10+2 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+4 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+6 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+8 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+10 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+3 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+5 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+7 (n=0~9) 
Peer n*10+9 (n=0~9) 
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Proportions of malicious peers was set to 10%, 20%, 30%, 
40%, and 50%, respectively, and the corresponding average 
number of successful transactions of non-malicious and 
malicious peers have been recorded respectively, including 
non-malicious providers, malicious providers, non-malicious 
customers, and malicious customers.  These simulation results 
are shown in TABLE IV and Fig. 9. By interpreting these 
results, it can be seen that the average number of successful 
transactions of malicious peers are at approximately 1% 
compared to those of non-malicious peers. Thus, non-malicious 
peers have a much higher chance to contribute and share Grid 
resources, while malicious peers are eliminated in participating 
in Grid resource allocation. Therefore, the TI-CDA’s key goal 
as identified and put forth as a design requirement in Section I 
has been achieved in full. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Based on these two sets of experiments and related 
simulation results, it can be concluded that the 
Trust-incentive-based Combinatorial Double Auction 
(TI-CDA) algorithm selects transaction peers not only 
according to their bids, but also according to their respective 
trust values of corresponding peers. TI-CDA is effective in 
solving the Grid resource allocation problem and at the same 
time at solving the problem of free-riding, since malicious 
peers in a distributed Grid environment are taken care of in the 
sense of a restricted participation probability in the auctioning 
process. Thus, the level of Grid security service offerings can 
be enhanced by preventing malicious peers to enter a 
transaction. As for the application of TI-CDA algorithm, the 
representative deployment is C2C eCommerce system similar 
to Taobao website, which accommodates multiple transaction 
requirements, including resources providing and consuming. 
For reliability and manageability reason, centralized implement 
architecture consisting of two components of the central server 
and the clients is more suitable. Among them, the central server 
is the core component responsible for the record and calculation 
of trust value table, process of Combination Double Auction for 
resource allocation and system maintenance, and the clients 
includes many peers which are widely distributed in Grid 
environment and act as the resource providers and resource 
customers. 
Therefore, this TI-CDA approach can be considered as an 
overall network management solution developed from the 
combination perspective of economic and security management 
for Grid resources allocation. It provides a new and effective 
scheme, which enables Grid service providers to allocate their 
resources in a resource modern management system with an 
integrated economic and technical optimization. This is even 
more important for future resource allocation approaches, since 
fully decentralized systems benefit from this decentralization as 
soon as a certain level of probability – and in future systems 
maybe even a guarantee – can be given to ensure that malicious 
peers are at least detected and prohibited from taking part in the 
auction.  
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TABLE  IV 
AVERAGE SUCCESSFUL TRANSATION NUMBERS OF
NON-MALICIOUS AND MALICIOUS PEERS 
Scenario 
(Malicious 
Peers’ 
Proportion) 
Average Number of Successful Transactions 
Malicious 
Providers 
Non- 
malicious 
Providers 
Malicious 
Customers 
Non- 
malicious 
Customers 
1 (10%) 6.8 619.9 5.0 620.2 
2 (20%) 7.4 602.1 4.3 602.9 
3 (30%) 7.6 543.7 3.0 545.6 
4 (40%) 5.9 560.8 2.5 564.2 
5 (50%) 5.6 287.5 3.7 289.4 
Fig.9: Average Number of Successful Transactions of 
Malicious Providers, Non-malicious Providers, and Malicious 
Customers, (Scenario 1, 2, 3, 4, 5: 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% 
Malicious Peers, respectively) 
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